Independence 15 August 1985

Independence 15 August 1985 

AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF BURMA 
By Zou Merng-Kao Tai

In march 1985, Burma's Defence Minister, General Kyaw Htin, disclosed that there were within the country 19 different rebel groups with whom the Burma Army clashed 3,014 times last year, of which 20 were major battles. 1

This means in effect there were on the average, eight armed engagements per day, or, 240 clashes a month. From this, it can be discerned that rebels have become more capable and collectively more formidable, a force not about to be easily defeated within a foreseeable future. 2 And if one stops to think of the country, human and material, caused by the over 35 years of this kind of fighting: and the losses suffered by innocent non-combatants caught in-between, one cannot help but sympathize with the sad plight Burma is in. The future is indeed very bleak, more so when Burma's per capita income is about that of Bangladesh. 

If such a disclosure was made, say, by General Arthit Kamlang-ek, the Thai Supreme Commander, or General Fidel Ramos of the Philippines, there is no doubt that American politicians and news editors, and as well, President Reagan himself, would all have, to be sure, raised voices in alarm and consternation, at the very least. Certainly, for a country, any country for that matter, to be swamped by over 3,000 armed clashes-this is by no means a laughing matter. As regard Burma however, it is most difficult to discern what American policy is, most particularly in the light of the seeming indifference or ignorance of American policy-framers and opinion makers relative to conditions and the politics of this country.3 Where Burma is mentioned, if at all, it is invariably within the context of the outflow of heroin from the "Golden Triangle".4 In a manner of speaking, even when touching on opium and heroin of the so-called "Golden Triangle," Americans seem totally in deep water that is to say, they do not seem to have, for example, the foggiest idea of where or what the "Golden Triangle" is. 

1. Reported in Bangkok Post, March 28 issue(1985). Also in the Nation. Curiously, the NDF(composed of Karen, Mon, Arakan, Karenni, Pa-O, and with the Kachin KIA, and Shan northern SSA as allies) gave the number of clashes, Oct. 1983-84, as 1,626 times. This does not include the Burma Army's clashes with the Communist Party of Burma, the SUA (Shan United Army), the SURA (Shan United Revolutionary Army), and the Read Pa-O group. The writer, frankly speaking, thought that the Front had exaggerated. 

2. In Shan State alone, rebels number over 20,000 seasoned guarrillas excluding the ex- KMT (Kuomintang) Chinese. Namely, Pa-O group, 300; Wa, 300; the SURA, SUA, and SSA, 12,000 regulars; and the Communist Party of Burma, 10,000 regulars. However, bulk of rebel soldiers are local peasant boys and terms of service most flexible. Nonetheless rebels are able to mobilize the people, hence their strength is limited only by availability of weapons and ammunition likewise in the Karen, Kachin, Karenni, etc, homelands.

3. American ignorance of Burma is total since all diplomats in Rangoon U.N. officials included, are virtually prisoners, unable to leave Rangoon except infrequently and restrictively. Yet, Washington insists that everything is well and improving. However, on the other hand, American officials privately admit to Rangoon's misrule and mismanagement, pointing this out as the cause of Burma's troubles.

4. This term was first coined by Adrian Cowell, the well-known documentary producer of ATV, London. He and Chris Menges, who won the Oscar for Photography in Putnam's "The Killing Fields", spent altogether 20 months in Shan State, producing "The Unknown War"(1967), and The "Opium Warlords"(1976). Cowell however meant the Shan State when he coined the term precisely because Shan State is triangular with base lying north-south aguinst the Burmese lowland, and the apex pointing east.
   To most Americans, particularly those in high places and in charge of the Asian heroin problem, the said Golden Triangle is no other than a certain patch of reeds and sand where the Maesai stream runs into the Maekhong.5 This desolate spot in North Thailand adjoining Burma's Shan State and Laos, where there is not a single poppy plant, has become, believer it or not, a place of pilgrimage for American VIPs and politicians,6 most particularly those wishing to be known as upright anti-narcotics crusaders, or desiring, what is termed as, "first-hand knowledge" of the opium-heroin question. 
   The impression one gains therefore from such befuddlement among Americans, high and low, is that whatever time or energy there is which can be spared on Burma, the focus or direction is exclusively on the opium-heroin phenomenon. It is if all things in Burma, and to some degrees in Thailand as well, hinges upon the amount of opium, heroin, processing chemicals, etc., intercepted by American, and U.S. taxpayers funded, drug enforcement bodies.

5. Thai tour operators named this desolate spot the "Golden Triangle" in order to sell tours to North Thailand. They however cannot be blamed of this deception since U.S. and U.N. reports describe the main opium area in Southeast Asia as "where the borders of Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet." This tourists ploy was however seriously taken up by governments and international bodies so that this spot became a sacred destination for all VIPs, This is a very good example of the sheer ignorance of the opium-heroin issue, and the deception and exploitation of this problem, to the detriment of the real victims--- Shan peasants and addicts of all nations. 

6. From the Carter years to the present, all highly placed Americans interested in, or wishing to exploit the opium-heroin question, have made pilgrimages to the so-called Golden Triangle. For example, in Jan-1985, top State Department and Pentagon people such as John Monjo, Millard Burr, James Kelly, Guy Parker, and lately, Clyde Taylor, all dutifully went to look at the reeds and mud of the Maesai stream and the Mekong. Even American academics who should know better-David Steinberg, Ansil Ramsey, Lee Rose, Robert Scalapino, Douglas Pike, Donald Emmerson, and even the veteran diplomat, Leonard Unger-- happily trotted off to the GT. Naturally none saw any poppy plant. Such pilgrimages are totally meaningless-an international self-deception.
   Thus, what we now have is a very odd situation where Washington has, perhaps by default more than by design, handed over all decisions and responsibilities relating to Burma to apolitical New York policemen types; and worse, clerks of American drug suppression bureaucracies. Given the fact that these suppression people are not only ignorant of, and uninterested in politics, but as well, dependent for daily bread and privileges on the opium-heroin problem, this abdication of power in Washington where it concerns Burma cannot be seen in any way, but as most irresponsible and short--- sighted.7 
   Basically, Burma is a political and sovereign entity which has been political and human problem of infinite complexities, compounded by application of wrong solutions--- such as, among many, an over 30 years internal : the basic and yet unresolved issue of national unity; a stagnant and sinking economy; demoralized civil-service; a decrepit administrative machinery; widespread corruption and inefficiency, and so forth.8 Hence, the fashion among Americans in government to simplify complex national problems in Burma to a single non-political cops-and-narcotics equation9 this is indeed worrying. 

7. That this is so can be deduced from statements on Burma by high American officials. For example, all Burma Army's drive against rebels are praised by Washington as commendable drive against narcotics. Moreover, drug suppression officers occupy high positions in U.S. diplomatic hierarchy in Rangoon, Bangkok, and Chiangmai. There are even plans afoot to have Rangoon do extensive crop spraying in Shan State. The inexplicable part is that military assistance to Rangoon and plans for crop-spraying are kept under tight cover by U.S. officials when in fact, the spraying of weed-killers over 62,000 sq-miles of the Shan homeland is a highly dangerous and inhumane act. 

8. The almost total breakdown and the myriad ills afflicting Burma since the military takeover of 1962, have been described and analysed by Americans knowledgeable about Burma such as Dr.Silverstein, David Steinberg, David Feingold, and as well, by Journalists and writers. Unfortunately, not much notice is given by U.S. policy-makers to these papers and reports. Incidentally, there are not more han 6 or 7 American scholars on Burma, but they are simply ignored due perhaps to Burma's low priority. 

9. From statements of high U.S. officials, and from briefings to journalists and American exchange students visiting Thailand given by Embassy officers. American officials seem to prefer seeing Burma's ethnic rebels as criminals dealing in contrabands or drugs, though in private they admit that Rangoon's misrule is responsible for widespread smuggling and rebellion. As a matter of fact, the conflict between Rangoon and the native ethnics goes back several centuries (especially with the Shan, Mon, and Arakanese). Also, the opium-heroin contraband activity, became a multimillion dollars industry only after the 1962 coup when the military nationalized everything and the encouragement by the Burma Army of the KKY of Homeguard Units, 1967-73, brought about a boom in this business, and the presence of Americans in South Vietnam spurred on the heroin business.
   There is to be sure, no denying that the United States is fully justified in its concern about Burma's heroin since it makes up a quarter10 of the amount flooding the streets of American cities. However, equally undeniable is the fact that the opium heroin problem is, within the context of Burma's political troubles and as far as the native eople are concerned not at all a central issue. The issue central to the ordinary people, is the ending of the war, i.e. a chance to live and work without combatants shooting, burning, looting and shedding blood all over the, place. For the elites, both the Burmese(or Burma) and the indigenous ethnics as well, the cardinal question is what constitutes unity or nationhood a question which is rooted in their collective past stretching back several 5 centuries.11 
   Hence, even though the opium heroin issue is, for Washington, a central one insofar as Burma is concerned, it is obvious and common sense, that this problem cannot be handled, much less resolved, unless one understands at the very least the socio-economic and political conditions and factors and their relationship with the heroin-opium problem. That is, there should be a correct perspective and wider perception of the country as a whole. At any rate, no human problem can be solved in isolation and without taking into account other factors as well. 
   In international politics or any human endeavor, it goes without saying, that a correct perception of objective factors is more important than action. In fact, one may set out with the best of intention and plans, the best technology and equipments even, but if one misreads a situation, or if one's perception is fatally flawed, no amount of goodwill, sacrifices, dollars, or military force will accomplish anything. In the end, everything will be sullied and corrupted as were American goals and the enormous sacrifices made in South Vietnam, 
   The lesson of Vietnam is precisely this. Namely, that American responses and actions must be based on correct perception and knowledge of the area in question, i.e., of a particular society and its people. The lesson is not that the United States should avoid all Asian involvements which, as far as can be percieved, seems to be erroneously taken by Americans as the lesson. As such, one cannot help but wonder how many Americans, especially in government, have really understood why the United States failed dismally and got its nonse thoroughly bloodied in Indochina. 

10. From American reports at various and numerous international and regional anti-narcotics conferences and seminars, and statements by American officials: the latest to make such a statement being Clyde Taylor, head of the U.S. anti-drug body. 

11. For example, the independence of Karenni was recognized by both the British and the Burmese (King Mindon) in 1875. The Arakanese kingdom fell to the Burmese only in 1782, and the Mon had their own kingdom till 1757. The Shan were dominant in Burma till 1555 (i.e., the Muang Mao Kingdom which lasted till 1604, until destroyed by the Chinese; ruled pagan after the Mongol invasion; established the kingdom of Pinya, Sagaing and Ava, covering nearly the whole of Burma; and the early Martaban kigndom in lower Burma). The hold by Burmese kings over other native kingdoms were never strong, and rebellions were constant. By the early 1880s, Shan princes had not only successfully rebelled, but were poised to capture the Burmese royal capital Mandalay. They were pre-empted by the British in 1885. As well, the Union of Burma of 1948 owed its existence to the Panglong Agreement, February 1947, signed between Aung San, the Burmese national leader, and the Shan, Chin, and Kachin leaders. As can be seen, the rebellions by ethnics groups is rooted in history and they played major roles in shaping events. They certainly cannot be dismissed as half-naked savages fighting to preserve barbaric practices and customs. It is most unfortunate that Western scholars and historians when writing Burma's history, invariable pay attention only to the Burmese kingdoms, treating other equally dynamic kingdoms as bothersome instructions best ignored for the sake of the smooth flow of the main narrative.
    It does seem that the greatest obstacle to clear American perception of Asian or Third world realities if their propensity to rub shoulders only with the socially beautiful cream of Third world societies, happily unaware that upward mobility in these societies is possible only for those already on the summit of the political pyramid. Americans are therefore ignorant of the reasons why the natives are restless, or why a country is plagued by rebellions. Another barrier is the inability of Americans to perceive of rebellions and civil conflict in Asia as being related to socio-economic and political imbalances within society, or recognize the impetus and forces within society for reforms and changes. Inevitably therefore, all rebellions and conflicts are labelled and dismissed by Americans as inspired by foreign communist agents, even by drug-pushers.12
    In the case of Burma, it does appear that the United States, in its anxiety to stop the outflow of heroin from Burma, has once again misread the situation, 
    Judging from various statements made by State Department officials and Embassy staff, it can be deduced that American policy-makers have somehow persuaded themselves that heroin from the streets of New Youk and other American cities can be got rid of by simply blasting all rebels in Burma to oblivion, Putting it another way, seeing Rangoon (or the Burmese elite) as anti-narcotics policemen, and assigning to rebels, the role of drug-dealing gangsters.13 that is, equating Rangoon's war against rebels with the crusade against drugs. 
    Here we come to a very important point: Is rebellion in Burma so organically linked with the outflow of Burma's heroin, so much so that the elimination of one will lead, however indirectly, to the eradication of the other? 
    The thinking among American officials is that Rangoon cannot do much about the cultivation of opium, its movement, its processing into heroin, and its trade because large areas of the country are under the control of various rebel armies.14 Therefore they surmise that the key to opium-heroin eradication lies in greater and firmer control by Rangoon of Burma, especially over opium growing areas and border regions.15

12. An example of this being the Vietnam war. The early Vietcongs, to be sure, were inspired by Ho Chi-minh and assisted by Northern cadres, but they were basically reformers. More important, those supporting the Vietcong constituted a large percentage of civilians and peasants who were misruled and oppressed by the Saigon elite. Likewise, to brand all of Burma's ethnic rebels as narcotics criminals while at the same time lacking first hand knowledge of socio-economic and political conditions in Burma this could create only more complicated problems for all concerned, the ordinary non-combatants of Burma especially. 

13. The relevant point is the degree of rebel involvement in the narcotics business. No factual study of this has been made, and no proofs offered of involvement. Shan rebels admit only to taxing growers and buying agents, occasionally, refineries and convoys. They say that most tax goes to ex-KMT Chinese armies because drug-dealers are themselves Chinese. As regard the most profitable part of the heroin business, its international trade, it is obvious that rebels have no hands in this. Getting into heroin trade requires very large capital (to buy up the raw opium for refining, for protection fec, bribes, salaries for chemists, purchase and smuggling of chemicals, pay for couriers, etc.), wide contacts, and access to markets-all of which are available only to members of the cross-border network of money-trade-kinship among ethnic Chinese. This however does not mean all Chinese are involved in heroin, just as one cannot accuse all ethnic Italians of New York of belonging to the mafia. 

14. Actually areas not under Rangoon's control are in effect No Man's Land. Rebel armies do not have the strength or capability to hold on to any areas in the face the army's offensives, except the Communist Party of Burma which holds a broad strip of land along the Shan-Chinese border. 

15. Various statements and reports on the opium-heroin problem by U.S officials. The Burmese government also gives out such a line. The overall impression one gets from such statements is that Rangoon is doing what it can against very great odds, i.e., that rebel armies are stronger and more superior, and Rangoon is helpless against them. (to be continued)