The war of figures continues

To which he was reported to have replied that it was not possible because “a vast tract of land would be needed for the cultivation of enough plants to meet Khun Sa’s target.” He added the MTA boss’s claim was little more than exaggeration and propaganda. (Bangkok Post, 29 January 1987)
 
Chavalit was not alone against Khun Sa’s figures. His own uncle Khun Seng aka Ronald Chang aka Chang Pingyun, who handled the group’s business affairs at that time, brushed away the claim by saying, “Let Khun Sa play his political game.” According to him, the annual production during the 1980’s was between 160-230 tons.
 
But as years went by, the world, or rather its drug warriors, began to change their minds about the figures. During the annual poppy season, they appeared to be trying to outdo the MTA leader by announcing the highest possible output. Thus by the time Khun Sa surrendered in 1996, figures as high as 2,625 tons were given, which would have made old hands like Chavalit to shrink back with embarrassment.
 
The only group that was heatedly disputing the US and UN figures as tall tales at that time was no other than the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). In 1998, it came up with its own estimate: 665.28 tons. (Why did U Khun Sa’s MTA exchange arms for peace, Maung Pho Shoke, 1999)
 
However, the SPDC started to change its mind on the US and figures, when it found out that the post-Khun Sa figures were in fact making them look good:
 
UN annual opium yield estimates
1996                                1,760 tons
1997                                1,676 tons
1998                                1,303 tons
1999                                  895  tons
 
Since then, loud denunciations from Rangoon began to die down and soon it was understandably riding the crest.

(SHAN, on 12 September 2007, met Xavier Bouan, the UNODC’s Regional Illicit Crop Monitoring Expert, who said earlier UN figures were based US annual survey results in Burma. “We started to do our own survey only after 2000, “ he told SHAN. “Naturally, we made a few mistakes at first. But over the years, you may have noticed that we have become quite proficient." He also affirmed during the meeting,” “Most of our findings converges with those of SHAN.")
 
However, at ground zero, at the level of farmers and drug entrepreneurs, the only time the regime launched a rather all-out war on poppy cultivation was 2002-2006:
 
2002        Chinese pressure results in forced renunciations and extrajudicial killings in northern Shan State
2003        Ban in Kokang
2005        Ban in Wa
2006        Ban in Loimaw (Khun Sa’s home town, the only place west of the Salween where opium was systematically grown for profit, since the British days)
 
Even so, poppy cultivation and its financiers have been moving down to Southern and Eastern Shan State since 2003, conforming to the balloon effect principle, where when one part of the balloon is squeezed,  the other parts begin to swell.
 
The result was the report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) in October 2007, which took a dramatic departure from its earlier reports claiming the Golden Triangle was “almost opium free,” by announcing that opium was back to Burma in force: a 46% increase in output.
 
Thus when a former associate of Khun Seng told me late last year that heroin entrepreneurs were expecting a pre- 2001-2002 season output level in the upcoming 2007-2008 season, there was little surprise expressed by the Burma watchers.
 
SHAN, in its 2006 report Hand in Glove, has already summoned up the conclusions:
 

• The regime’s cardinal aim is to destroy the Opposition, not drugs
• Accordingly, pro-regime individuals and movements are being granted immunity
• Also accordingly, it has been embarking on a non-stop expansion of the Army
• Its policy of self-reliance for its military units are fostering involvement in drugs

 
“Solutions to the drug problem formulated and tried thus far smack of putting out the smoke instead of the fire,” said the late Shan scholar and leader Chao Tzang Yawnghwe (1939-2004). “It’s time to think outside the box.”
 
As to the solution, I did not think anybody could have put it better than The Nation, 26 January 2006:
 
Any counter narcotic policy to succeed in Burma must take into consideration the political side of the problem. Political solutions have not been properly explored, but this is the only way to get the bottom of Burma’s vicious circle linking illicit drugs, insurgency, reconciliation and democracy.
 
Khuensai Jaiyen

 
The writer is the co-author of several in-depth drug reports, including Show Business (2003), Hand in Glove (2006) and Shan Drug Watch (2007).