Friday, 02 October 2009 10:27
By: Sai Wansai
The latest US double-track policy of direct engagement and sanctions with the Burmese generals should be welcomed. It is also an innovation in itself to try a different tack, given that the “stick” alone has not produce result after more than two decades of implementation.
On September 30, 2009, Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, delivered a statement of “U.S. Policy Towards Burma” before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in Washington, DC.
The core reason behind such change from no engagement to direct engagement is that “Neither sanctions nor engagement, implemented alone, have succeeded in improving those conditions and moving Burma forward on a path to democratic reform”, according to the statement.
Other reasons opting for direct engagement approach are the Burmese junta’s gesture of active interest in engaging with the United States, plus its in own interest to do so.
The statement said: “In addition to taking a hard look at the current situation inside Burma, we also focused on emerging questions and concerns regarding Burma’s relationship with North Korea, particularly in light of the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which prohibits member states from engaging in trade with North Korea in virtually all conventional weapons as well as in sensitive technologies, including those related to ballistic missiles and nuclear and other WMD programs”.
One doesn’t actually need to be a political pundit to pinpoint what should and could be done to defuse the atmosphere of animosity and foster reconciliation process in Burma.
Also the Burmese junta is not that ignorant or have absolutely no clue on how to tackle the pressing need and aspiration of the people. But rather it is determined to cling on to power indefinitely and continuously.
While engaging directly is, no doubt, a good and reasonable approach, it is also essential to deeply look into the underlying core conflict issues and junta’s mindset, as to why it is so uncompromising and unyielding, when it comes to facilitating genuine reconciliation and democratisation process.
• Conceptual differences on defining nation-state
The successive military dominated regimes, including the ruling SPDC, see Burma as an existing unified nation since the reign of Anawratha thousands of years ago. As such, all other non-Burmans - Shan, Kachin, Chin, Arakanese, Mon, Karen and Karenni - are seen as minorities, which must be controlled and suppressed, lest they break up the country.
On the other hand, the non-Burmans maintain that the Union of Burma is a newly developed territorial entity, founded by a treaty, the Panglong Agreement, where independent territories merged together on equal basis.
Given such conceptual differences, the Burmese military goes about with its implementation of protecting "national sovereignty" and "national unity" at all cost. This, in turn, gives way to open conflict resulting in more suppression and gross human rights violations. The intolerance of the military and its inspiration to "racial supremacy" and to political domination and control has no limit and this could be seen by its refusal to hand over power to the winners of 1990 nation-wide election, the NLD, SNLD and other ethnic parties. The genuine federalism platform, which the NLD and ethnic nationalities embrace, is a threat to its racist mind-set, obsessed with domination and control.
• Constitutional Crisis
The woes of Burma today are deeply rooted in the inadequate constitutional drafting of 1947. The Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. The ethnic homelands were recognised as constituent states but all power was concentrated in the central government or the government of the Burma Mother state.
Almost all the non-Burmans and Burman democratic opposition groups are in agreement that the ethnic conflict and reform of social, political and economics cannot be separated from one another. And the only solution and answer is to amend the 1947 Constitution according to Panglong Agreement, where equality, voluntary participation and self-determination, of the constituent states, formed the basis for the Republic of the Union of Burma.
As such, the junta’s orchestrated, present 2008 constitution, dubbed Nargis constitution, due to the rigging of referendum vote by the junta shortly after Nargis cyclone, is just the opposite and still a far cry from satisfying the will of non-Burman ethnic groups and democratic opposition, which is designed to give the military a clear political monopoly and military supremacy in all aspects of governing the country.
• Junta’s commitment to uphold military supremacy over civilian rule
Rightly or wrongly, the junta has appointed itself to be the sole saviour of the country and the believe that the army under its command is the only institution that is capable of governing the country. In other words, the junta is entitled to rule over the civilian, with the help of the army.
• Aspiring to build the fourth Burmese empire
While it is officially hard to prove that Senior General Than Shwe, undisputed leader of the Burmese junta, aspires to be the king and dreams of building a fourth Burmese empire, indications are pointing to such ambition, even if this would be a mere wishful-thinking in practical term.
First, the new capital Naypidaw was built 3.2 km west of Pyinmana, and approximately 320 km north of Rangoon, at huge expense unknown to outsiders. On 6 November 2005, the administrative capital was officially moved and the capital's official name was announced on 27 March 2006, Burmese Armed Forces Day. Naypyidaw means "Great City of the Sun", but is also translated as "abode of kings".
Second, the three big statues towering over Naypyidaw, which are supposed to be King Anawrahta, King Bayinnaung and King Alaungpaya, were built at Senior General Than Shwe’s instruction.
The first Myanmar Empire was created by King Anawrahta of the Bagan Dynasty (1044-1077 AD). The second Myanmar Empire was created by King Bayinnaung of the Taungoo Dynasty (1551-1581 AD). The third Myanmar Empire was led by King Alaungpaya of the Konbaung Dynasty (1752-1760 AD).
As such, one could easily guess that the founder of Naypyidaw, Senior General Than Shwe, who happens to be the final decision maker for the country, might as well be aspiring to be dubbed as the unifier of the present day Burma. If this happen to be the case and he really does believe he is a monarch who should be credited with building the Fourth Burmese Empire in the country’s political history, he won’t easily abdicate his throne on his own.
• Assimilation of non-Burman ethnic groups or Burmanisation
The Burmese junta’s urge for assimilation of non-Burman ethnic nationalities is closely intertwined with its version of forging national identity.
It is not at all surprising that the junta’s implementation of its Burmanisation scheme has lead to burning down the whole village, destroying crops and rice fields, confiscation of property, population transfer and using rape as a weapon of war in non-Burman ethnic areas. This has always been part and parcel of the unspoken junta’s plan. Thousands and thousands of internally displaced persons, huge population of refugees in neighbouring countries like Thailand, Bangladesh, India and China are living evidence of the junta’s four-cut strategy – cutting the supply of intelligence, food, recruits and finances of the ethnic resistance forces - to coercively and ruthlessly push through its assimilation scheme.
The views of successive Burmese governments, including the present regime, SPDC, concerning national identity has never been clear. They have been at a loss even as to what sort of name they should adopt; that is the reason why they are still using "Bamar“ and "Myanmar" interchangeably for what they would like to be termed a common collective identity, in other words, national identity. The reality is that when one mentions "Myanmar", "Bamar", "Burmese" or "Burman", such words are usually identified with the lowland majority "Bamar” and have never been accepted or understood by the non-Bamar ethnic nationals as a common collective identity to which they also belong.
For about a decade ago, the present Burmese military regime changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. Its aim is to create a national identity for every ethnic group residing within the boundary of the so-called Union of Myanmar. But since the name Myanmar has always been identified with the lowland "Bamar", the SPDC’s effort in trying to establish a common national identity among the non-Bamar ethnic nationals is doomed to fail. On top of that, this national identity was not chosen with the consent of the non-Bamar ethnic groups, but coercively thrust down their throats by the hated Burmese military dictatorship.
It has never occurred that anyone mentioning that he or she is a Bamar Myanmar, Shan Myanmar, Kachin Myanmar, Karen Myanmar and so on. In the United States, by contrast, it is normal that one considers or accepts oneself as an American; such as, the use of Chinese American, Japanese American, Afro-American and so on are common and widespread.
Another crucial point that most tend to overlook is that the maintenance of the former European colonial boundaries as irreversible and sacrosanct national state boundaries. This, in reality, only creates unending ethnic conflicts the world over affecting international stability. Burma is such a case, infested with ethnic and social conflicts.
The point to note here is that the successive Burmese governments' nation-building process has totally shattered, failing even to take root after all these years, not to mention the forging of common national identity. It would be more pragmatic to accept the existing diversified “national identities” of all ethnic nationalities as a fact and work for a new common identity in the future federal union with the consent and participation of all ethnic groups, Burman included.
• Majority-Minority Configuration
The misconception of majority-minority configuration has been so entrenched; at least in media and academic studies, it needs some clarification.
The Burman are majority in Burma Proper and in numerical sense, but become a minority in the Shan, Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, and the Mon states, where respective ethnic groups are in majority within their own territories.
Besides, Burma was formed in 1947 by virtue of the Panglong Agreement, one year prior to independence. This agreement was signed between the interim government of Ministerial Burma, headed by Aung San, and leaders of the Federated Shan States, the Chin Hill Tract, and the Kachin Hill Tract. It could be said that this agreement is the genesis of the post-colonial, current Burma.
Thus, the indigenous groups of Burma -- Shan, Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mon and including the Burman -- are not minorities or majorities but equal partners in a union of territories, the Union of Burma.
The heart of the problem is the stubbornness of the military clique clinging to power at all cost, when pragmatic political will and accommodation would do the job and jump start genuine reconciliation and democratisation process.
The recent releasing of one hundred or more political prisoners - from more than two thousand detainees - is, in fact, a half-hearted undertaking of the junta to touch the water prior to its charm offensive, particularly with the US, and to ease international pressure for its oppressive rule. In addition, it is taking credit for partially yielding to UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon’s suggestion to release all political prisoners. To put it differently, the junta is only doing or giving as little as possible, while aiming to reap as much benefit as possible, in terms of accumulating legitimacy and acceptance of its self-drawn constitution, coupled with its forthcoming 2010 election, which are likely to be manipulated, rigged and stage-managed from beginning to the end.
On 30 September, Democratic Voice of Burma reported that U Win Tin, senior member of the National League for Democracy said that the new US approach mirrored the policy advocated by Burma’s regional neighbours and that he was not convinced that the situation in Burma could be handled by soft approach. He said that the engagement policy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also failed to produce result and that the U.S. would fall into the same trap where every aspect of engagement will be dictated by the junta.
But it is still too early to draw any such conclusion to the new U.S. diplomatic attempt. At this point, it is still unclear on how the double-track U.S. direct engagement and sanctions would be able to advance the will and aspiration of the people. But one sure thing is that democratic change could come about with the junta’s change of heart, which are identical with accepted international norms and in tune with the civilised world. And that is none other than taking serious concern of the need satisfaction and value of the people, rather than senselessly reinforcing its rhetoric of self-appointed national saviour role of the whole country. In other words, the junta must try to fulfil the democratic aspiration, equality and rights of self-determination of the people in words and deeds.
And finally, if the U.S. is to succeed in its implementation of this innovative, dual-track policy, the junta needs to make the first move of unconditional release of all political prisoners, followed by amendment of its military supremacy constitution with all stakeholders, nation-wide cease-fire with all ethnic groups and conduct an all-inclusive and transparent election. Otherwise, the internal conflict will go on unabated and there will be no way out of this impasse, which we have been in for nearly five decades.
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