Naypyidaw’s winning strategy is to subdue smaller ceasefire groups first and deal with the strongest ones, namely, Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and United Wa State Army (UWSA) afterwards, according to an informed source from Naypyidaw.
Meanwhile, the two would be kept under siege in order to contain their movements, forcing them to cut down their revenue and increase their expenditures. “Like Kokang in August and Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army in 1996, the regime will also try to create and exploit divisions within each group,” he said.
Khun Sa decided to surrender after a mutiny broke out in mid 1995. Until then, he had been staunchly withstanding blockades imposed not only by the Burma Army and the UWSA, but also by Thailand, where most of his supplies came from.
“Among the 4 remaining ceasefire groups, Naypyidaw may not think much of the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) and the New Mon State Pary (NMSP) as both are smaller and isolated,” he explained. “But as for the two others, the Shan State Army (SSA) North and Mongla, they are considerably stronger and, more importantly, they cover the Wa’s western and southern flanks. The regime will therefore focus their efforts on the two.”
The Wa’s northern border with Kokang has already been occupied by the Burma Army in August.
Since then, Mongla, officially Shan State Special Region #4, and the SSA North, officially Shan State Special Region #3, have been under pressure to accept the Border Guard Force (BGF) proposal and Home Guard Force (HGF) proposal respectively.
Mongla, on 28 October, had already been “advised” to resign itself to the BGF status. The media-shy SSA North, meanwhile, had been recently told by Maj Gen Aung Than Tut, Commander of the Lashio-based Northeastern Region Command, to stand by their 23 June 2009 letter that said its leadership “appreciates” the ruling military council’s “good intentions” and had been meeting and persuading its lower ranks to “accept” the proposal, according to a report yet to be confirmed.
The situation nevertheless might not turn out as planned, according to veteran border watchers. “Mongla territory, located in the triangle (China, Burma and Laos) is considered by the Wa as their lifeline,” said one. “They might not let it go, even if it wants to. That might trigger premature military confrontation with the Burma Army.”
Out of Burma’s 17 official ceasefire groups, 5 are no longer at ceasefire status. Six have already accepted the BGF proposals. For more information on this, please read
The ceasefire armies: Once bitten, once shy? (19 October 2009)