Khun Sa

Khun Sa - From Mutiny To Surrender

On the 5th anniversary of the rebellion that shook the mighty Mong Tai Army to its very foundation, S.H.A.N. makes an attempt to recount what really happened. 

The year 1995 began as one that appeared propitious for Khun Sa, who had just declared independence over a year ago. 

The raid on Tachilek by his troops on 20 March, and the day-long fight of the Shan officer trapped inside Burmese encirclement until his ammo was exhausted and he committed suicide, all under the watchful eyes of the local and international media, only served to enhance Khun Sa's image. 

Reuters even wrote an article speculating whether Khun Sa was emerging as the real leader of the Shan State. Bangkok Post said his MTA was "the only rebel group left with teeth.

" His 25,000-strong MTA was operating almost all over the 160,000 square kilometers of Shan State, leaving only territories under the control of Kokang and Wa. Even top secret Burmese intelligence reports conceded that the MTA was even stronger than the United Wa State Army. Fed up with decades under military rule, even the Burman population on the western outskirts of Shan State were offering to lend a hand if the MTA were to operate there. "No group can be worse than the present one," they said. 

All in all, every outward sign indicated 1995 was going to be a great year for Khun Sa. Even some close observers thought the MTA's shortcomings could wait until after the final showdown with Rangoon. 

It turned out they should have known better. 

Unknown to most people, the MTA was reeling under the border closure imposed by Thailand. Prices and consequent expenditure had rocketed skyhigh in Homong. To make things worse, his imposition of exorbitant tax rates had driven many "business establishments" to the rival UWSA and the safe sanctuaries offered by Burmese authorities. 

To add to these misfortunes, the MTA renewed its war against the Was for no apparent reason. Pao Sin, a Wa officer, told S.H.A.N. later, "We thought we had stopped killing each other, but the MTA began the war again by ambushing our troops twice. The first ambush alone killed 16 of our men." 

This internecine war also cost the MTA dearly in terms of morale and resources. The first sign of unhappiness came with the desertion of Maj. Ngo Harn to the SSA in April, accusing Khun Sa of administering poison to his superior, Sao Sai Lek, who had died in Homong on 5 January. Sao Sai Lek had recently arrived from the north at Khun Sa's invitation to join the MTA. A fighter since 1960, he was widely respected by Shan patriots. He was only 54 when he passed away. 

Luckily, Khun Sa got off easily, when Sai Lek's surviving brother, Maj Sai Lu, testified to the National Congress, a joint body of people's representatives and the resistance, that his brother's death was only through natural causes. No unhappy ramifications followed. 

Khun Sa's next ill-advised move was to send out a controversial order in May to Maj. Gunyawd, then an acting brigade commander, to attack the Shan State Army, a group that had signed a ceasefire pact with Rangoon in 1989. "I was flabbergasted," said Gunyawd later. "We had just made an agreement with the SSA leaders for a merger. Already many of their commanders were preparing to come and join hands with us.

" S.H.A.N., along with many others at the Thai border, learned only too late about what had happened. The reasons for these two controversial moves, i.e. the order to attack the Was as well as the one to attack the SSA, therefore remain a mystery until today. (However, it must be added that for some observers who were convinced Khun Sa had always been Rangoon's agent, the reasons were clear. Nevertheless, there has not yet been any convincing evidence for their allegation). 

Gunyawd, much to Homong's frustration, chose to disobey the controversial command. An order inevitably went out for his arrest. Somehow, Gunyawd, well-liked both among the troops and the populace, got wind of the order and made his escape with 60 of his men. They were joined by other dissatisfied units and eventually swelled up to 17 battalions. The mutineers called themselves the Shan State National Army and made peace with Rangoon. 

Charges and Counter-charges 

According to the SSNA's leaflets published on 24 June 1995, Chang Shee-fu (Khun Sa) and Chang Hsu-chuan (Falang, Khun Sa's Manchurian chief-of-staff) were guilty of several charges, among which were: inequality (i.e. favoring Chinese descendants over Shans) disrespect for the people and the monkhood, extrajudicial executions (one of Gunyawd's top fighters, Ternyai, was executed, without notification to Gunyawd, for his "public condemnation" of Chinese-born officers), fighting with Shan nationals more than with the Burmese military, denial of the right to present constructive criticisms and defamation of the resistance with the drug image. ("Freedom shall remain an elusive dream under him", said one leaflet. "It's like attracting international assistance for Rangoon to wipe the Shans out".) 

Khun Sa and his supporters countered the charges by saying, "This must be a conspiracy by overseas Shans led by Sengsuk (leader of the Shan State Organization as well as the Shan Democratic Union) and the people from Hsengkeo (Shan State Army "North"'s headquarters)". Khun Sa himself said, "Gunyawd has jeopardized my plan to restore the Shan State in two years. He has helped to prolong the Burmese military's misrule over our people". 

"Has he forgotten that it was Khun Sa who had defeated both the White Chinese (i.e. Kuomintang) and the communists?" 

His close aides also sided with him by arguing, "Is there any existing group that has not received aid and support from the Chinese(-born)? Gunyawd has gone from us but isn't he going over to a regime that is being propped up by the Chinese?" 

As the mutiny was made known to the people on the border on 20 June, two weeks after the incident, the reactions were at first mixed. 

Many knew they were in a difficult situation and speaking the wrong words might put themselves and their families in danger. 

At the same time, there were some Shan commanders who sided with Khun Sa. "Khun Sa may have his faults, but he's not with the Burmese (military) like Gunyawd," said one. "The resistance has had to drag on for more than 30 years because the university students broke away from Sao Noi (the founder of the first resistance movement). How much longer will our people have to suffer because of Gunyawd's treachery?" 

Some, led by Khwanmong, Chief Polical Officer, and "Minister of the Interior", suggested to Khun Sa the need for reform before it was too late. "The issue is not Chinese vs Shans," one said. "It is a matter of system or lack of it. Just look at Thailand. Their independence was won by Taksin, a Chinese descendant. Many of their leaders today are also of Chinese origins, but it is not an issue there, because the Thais have evolved a system in which both Thais and non-Thais can live and work together. We can begin here with a collective leadership." 

Khwanmong spoke scathingly of Khun Sa's attempts to soothe the feelings of the leaders of Shan origin by announcing promotions for many of them. Instead of handing the certificates to the officers in a ceremony, he had merely made them feel worse by sending a junior officer with a motorcycle to distribute the papers to the recipients. "It showed us how little he respected us," Khwangmong was said to have told Falang. 

Reform 

Anyhow, with Khun Sa's blessings, the proposition made by Khawnmong and other sensible leaders, both Chinese and Shan alike, began to be implemented. 

On 12 August, two months after the mutiny, a congress was convened to form the Central Executive Committee, chaired by the popular Gunjade, and co-chaired by Zarmmai and Falang. A judiciary committee, chaired by Nawmong Awn, was also formed to ensure proper administration of justice. The overall strategy of the CEC was for reconciliation among the Shan groups especially with the renegade SSNA. 

This was at once denounced by Khun Sa himself, who declared that the CEC, under Khawnmong's management, was only "following Gunyawd's ass" instead of leading him. Khun Sa, who in his younger days, had countered insubordination to his leadership with a heavy hand, said, "What the CEC should have done was to order an expedition against the traitor". This, nevertheless, did not keep him from signing his approval of the CEC. 

A month later, an agreement was reached with Gunyawd to enter a ceasefire pact with Rangoon under the cloak of the SSNA, that had already signed one. The new leadership, re-named the Shan State National Council, would be composed of Gunjade as chairman and Gunyawd as General Secretary, among others. 

The resolution was publicly attacked by Khun Sa on 7 November as submission to traitorous elements. Quietly but firmly, he took back his powers from the CEC. 

The situation that followed was almost anarchic. Chairman Gunjade, who traveled to central Shan State to negotiate with Gunyawd, returned with only 100 of his initial 500 troops after the talks broke down, the rest fleeing to join hands with the latter. 

Meanwhile the attack made by the Was in Loilang on 20 September was repulsed. The MTA seemed to be winning all the battles, according to the reports. But the same reports also told S.H.A.N. the MTA was losing the war, because troops were deserting their positions in droves. 

Khun Sa, who was reported to have begun taking drugs, only worsened the situation by declaring publicly that the "extrajudicial executions" as charged by Gunyawd were ordered by himself. Audiotapes recorded by himself offering monetary rewards to those who could assassinate Gunyawd were also shown to S.H.A.N. by people in Bangkok, Chiangmai and Chiangrai. Inevitably, his actions only served to send things further out of control. Afterwards, there was a deluge of desertions to Gunyawd's camp. 

Last Days 

On 18 October 1995, a S.H.A.N. source in Chiangrai reported that Khun Sa had sent a secret message to Tachilek through his emissary, Wu Zeng-liang. He also reported that Kyaw Myint and Lao Tai a.k.a. Tin Maung Win a.k.a. Yang Wangsuan, both Khun Sa's trusted lieutenants, had gone across to Maesod to talk with the authorities in Rangoon.

Nearly two months later, on 14 December, Zarmhurng a.k.a. Pathai Changtrakul a.k.a. Chang Weikang, Khun Sa's second son, showed S.H.A.N. a radio message: the high command had agreed to make a "partial" surrender to Rangoon. 

This news spread like wildfire to the whole "Free territory of Shan State" in the Trans-Salween areas. 

On 29 December, S.H.A.N. was back in Homong for the last time. 

Sources told S.H.A.N. that Khun Seng had gone across the Salween on 18 December to prove to Rangoon that "Khun Sa was acting in good faith." They also related that Khun Seng's 23 loyal bodyguards were also put to death on the orders of Khun Sa on 17 December, on suspicion of conspiring to assassinate the MTA leaders. On 25 December, Khun Sa made a final public appearance in Mongmai, a few kilometers south of Homong. He told his audience that he would be back within two years, "when people learn for themselves that Khun Sa is better than anyone else", hinting that he would be leaving Homong soon. 

During our brief meeting, Khun Sa disclosed that Col. San Pwint from Rangoon would be arriving in Homong on the next day. He also indicated that the further presence of S.H.A.N. in the area would be an embarassment. 

"Try to set up your office in Thailand from now on," he said.

 We were already out of Homong when he officially surrendered to Gen. Tin Htut, Commander of Eastern Command, on 7 January 1996. 

So, why did he do this? 

To some like Sao Sengsuk, former commander-in-chief of the SSA and at present a leader of the overseas Shans, the reason was simple. "He was only going back to his masters," he said. "I knew it well ahead". 

For others who had lived and worked with him, it was not that simple. 

"He always said that there was no place for him to live in peace unless Shan State was free. Wanted by drug agencies around the world, he had nowhere to go except to live among the Shans to fight for them," said a former close aide. "So when the Shans showed they didn't want him anymore, the only choice that remained for him was to make the best deal he could with the Burmese". 

Soon afterwards The Bangkok Post predicted that the surrender spelled the end of the Shan resistance. But it was not to be so. A hitherto little known commander, Yawdserk, rose out from among the ashes to wave the flag of resistance in the same month that Khun Sa surrendered, and, by all accounts, his numbers appear to be swelling. 

Does he have any more chance than Khun Sa had? S.H.A.N. does not have an answer for this, but a report that arrived a few days ago seems to provide one: 

"(Someone close to Khun Sa) had dispatched a message to Yawdserk, counselling him that he shouldn't emulate Khun Sa by refusing to listen to well-meaning people. Had Khun Sa not learned to trust only his own counsel, he might not have been wasting his life away in Rangoon like he is doing now, said the message."