Shan State Progress Party

Shan State Progress Party (1971-95) Learning it the hard way

On 16 August, the 29th birthday of a Shan party that is no longer in existence will be celebrated by a few Shans who still cherish its memory.

It was formed by leaders of the Shan State Army "to counter the Communist Party of Burma politically," according to Bertil Lintner. On New year's Day of 1968, the "People's Army" launched an operation from across the border. The campaign won the communists a stable base in Kokang and Wa areas between the Salween and Mao's China. With its offer of "Arms in exchange for political principles," it won several allies among the anti-Rangoon movements that were hard pressed for arms.

All in all, there were only two Shan movements that stood in the way of the CPB's advance into Burma proper: the Shan State Army led by the Mahadevi of Yawnghwe and Shan United Revolutionary Army led by Kornzurng. While the latter chose to ally himself with the universally hated Kuomintang 3rd Army of Li Wen-huan in order to secure a base along the border of the staunchly anti-communist Thailand, the former was following a precarious go-it-alone line.
It was not a popular choice even among the ranks. The reason was plain enough: although there were thousands of Shan youth ready to join the struggle, there were few weapons to equip them, let alone food, clothing and funds. Revenues from annual taxation of farmers, even poppy farmers, brought them no more than a hundred assorted weapons each year. "At this rate, how can we hope to regain our freedom," several officers had fumed.

Meanwhile, the bulk of opium and heroin, together with the bulk of income, were going to the government-sponsored home guards, who were better dressed and better armed. 

"It wasn't very different from what we are seeing in Burma today. The only difference is that nowadays they are doing it on a larger scale and with more impunity," said a retired fighter. "The resistance is being blamed by Rangoon for the drug problem, but, considering its laissez- faire policy towards today's home guards and ceasefire groups, nobody who wants to deal in drugs need fight Rangoon at all."

The SSA leaders obviously thought that the danger of class struggle within a society brought by the communists would far outweigh the benefits their material assistance could bring. "What Shans need most has always been unity," said Kornzurng. "The communists, whose primary activity is to sow discord among the people, are inherently enemies of the Shan cause."

Their solution, therefore, was to establish a mass party that was ideologically well equipped i.e. nationalistic and democratic, to counter the Marxist-Leninist dogma. 

Sengsuk, Commander-in-Chief of the SSA, was elected President, and Chao Tzang Yawnghwe Secretary General. 
Less than 4 years later, Sengsuk and Yawnghwe's National Democratic line was denounced by Zarmmong, the effective leader of the military faction, at the Panghoong Congress. The faction instead called for complying with the conditions set by the communists for the sake of free arms. 

That the army faction was getting the upper hand was obvious not only because of Zarmmong's popularity. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were on the verge of collapse. The next one to follow suit, at least in the calculation of many, was clearly Burma. The implication was unquestionable: If the Shans were slow to jump on the bandwagon, they might be swallowed up in the oncoming wave of the communist victory. If, instead, they did not lose time in joining up at least as allies, there was still some hope for the Shan cause. 

Besides, the strategy of obtaining moral and material assistance from the west through the offers made by Sengsuk, Boontai (Vice president) and Yawnghwe to cooperate in the War on Drugs had come to nothing but grief. In the eyes of the militant majority, the Free World led by the Americans was not only a paper tiger but downright satanic in its refusal to come to the rescue of the needy Shan people who looked towards it as their champion.

At the meeting with the CPB leaders on 20 April 1975 in Simao, Yunnan, the Shan delegation agreed to scrap their initial call for "National Democracy and Self Determination" to be replaced by "People's Democracy and Local autonomy". 4 months later, on the 4th anniversary of the founding of the SSPP, the SSA was presented with 567 assorted weapons plus 76,726 buthets. They were also promised more in the future. To the Shans, most of whom had never seen such a huge display of arms before, it was indeed a fulfillment of their dreams. 

Their dreams were shattered when Mao died in 1976 and his successors led by Deng Xiaoping abandoned a confrontational line with China's neighbors. Massive aid to the CPB was gradually curtailed. To worsen the situation, the communist leadership in Panghsang ill-advisedly demanded Total Submission to the party's leadership from the SSPP. Not unexpectedly, the demand merely fell on deaf ears. However, many decided to preserve the alliance with the CPB, although some of them chose to join the anti-communist camp of Kornzurng in 1984. 

It came as no surprise when the army faction again voted to follow the ex-CPB units of Kokang and Wa by signing a cearefire agreement with Rangoon in 1989 in the absence of its party secretary general, SaiLek.

The shrunken party, under SaiLek's leadership, continued to function until 1995 when he died under mysterious circumstances in Khun Sa's headquarters of Homong.

Speaking of the SSPP, its former president, Sao Sengsuk, told S.H.A.N. "The Party's greatest weakness was the lack of educational work. Every time we sat down at meetings together, we seemed to be speaking in the same direction. There didn't seem any difficulty in working out a consensus among us. Naturally I thought they all knew what I knew and paid scant attention to the task of adequate indoctrination for our members and sympathizers. 

"Our greatest mistake was our failure to teach our party constitution and to drill the members to get used to the democratic procedures stated in the constitution. 

"We therefore deserve the blame for the undemocratic and often ill-considered decisions taken by the party beginning in 1975".

Maybe somewhere, some functioning parties- the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Shan Democratic Union etc- and some other parties in the making will take heed of the hindsight of this 65 year old veteran of the Shan struggle.

At least not to repeat the same mistake.