The Tripartite Struggle: An Analogy to Romance of the Three Kingdoms
The
following article was the basis on which the presentation delivered by Khuensai
Jaiyen to the journalists who attended the seminar organized by the Southeast
Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA) on 28 April 2008.
The
article first appeared in the Independence newsletter, October 1999
issue – Editor
In my mind,
the junta in Rangoon has always been T'sao T'sao (Jo Cho in Thai) and his Wei
bunch; Aung San Suu Kyi and the Burmese Opposition, Liu Pei (Lao Pi in Thai)
and Shu; and the non-Burmans, as a whole, Sun Ch'uan (Sun Kuan in Thai) and
Wu.
I had been fascinated during my early years by "Red Star Over China",
a book written in the late 1930's by Edgar Snow. It was about the Chinese
Communist Party's struggle against the Kuomintang and the Japanese just before
the beginning of World War II. In fact, the book became sort of a political
bible for me until fires consumed it sometime in 1996.
Snow had made reference to Romance of the Three Kingdoms a lot, but I
never had a chance to know what it was all about until 1987, when Jim Hamerle,
a close friend until his death in 1994, presented to me a complete set, in two
volumes, totalling 1,261 pages, translated by C.H. Brewitt-Taylor.
It was the story of the tripartite struggles among the three groups in China. -Wei,
Shu and Wu- between the years 220-265
A.D. The gist of the romance is as follows:
Towards the end of the Han Dynasty, the kings became weaker and the ministers,
especially the prime ministers, who were supposed to represent the King in all
matters, became de facto rulers of the country. They were corrupt and, as a
result, to no surprise, the people suffered. Rebellions and coups inevitably
took place. Corrupt governments were, again to no surprise, replaced by more
corrupt governments. Until T'sao T'sao came into power and he was the worst and
the smartest of them all.
Not unexpectedly, his injustices and oppressive policies only served to create
more uprisings and breakup of the country. The country was divided roughly into
three parts:

North of the Yangtze, south of
the Great Wall was Wei, ruled by Tsao Tsao;
South of the Yangtze, the
western section was Shu, ruled by Liu Chang;
And South of the Yangtze, the
eastern section was Wu, ruled first by Sun T'se, then later, by Sun
Ch'uan.
Both latter groups were satisfied just to be left alone and have nothing to do
with the former.
Enter Liu Pei,
his two sworn brothers, Kuan Yu and Chang Fei, and his brilliant chief of
staff, Chuko Liang, better known as K'ung Ming (Khong Beng in Thai).
The author, Lo Kuang-chung, portrays Liu as a demi-Buddha. He had long ears
that touched his shoulders and arms long enough to touch his knees with his
fingers when standing upright.
He, as a scion of the Hans, was there to restore their power and to bring peace
and justice to the people.
Liu and his brothers, backed by the people, fought relentlessly against T'sao
T'sao only to be defeated. And every time he was defeated, he went back to the
people for more support, which he got only to be lost again in the following
campaign.
His defeat brought more reprisals by his universally hated enemy aganist the people
until finally he thought he himself was the cause of more suffering for the
people and even contemplated commiting suicide.
Then some knowledgeable supporters advised him he should have a chief of staff,
one who could do both strategic and tactical planning for him. The man that
they recommended was K'ung Ming.
K'ung Ming's Strategy
Liu Pei
was already 46 when he first met K'ung Ming who was 20 years younger. Yet Liu Pei,
almost always a humble man,listerned attentively to the latter outlining his
ideas in the following way (some words added by KJ):
"The people trust and support you because of your regard for their
welfare. Unfortunately you have made at least two mistakes.
"The first is the resort to confrontation without having adequate or
superior force. Ts' ao Ts'ao is all powerful now. He rules an immense army and
the various feudal lords in the north i.e. Wei as well. You cannot think of
opposing him here. Yet you have opposed him several times -- and lost.
"The second mistake is the lack of a permanent base from where you can
both defend yourself and expand your force.
"I would suggest you yield to Ts'ao Ts'ao in the north till the time
Heaven beckons. As for establishing yourself in the south i.e. Wu, it is also
out of the question. The Suns have been there for three generations. Their
position may not appear too secure, but they have popularity to appeal to. You
can gain your support but shall gain no success there. Thus you will have to
yield to Sun Ch'uan till the position may become favorable.
"However we can move to the western territory which extends to the ancient
states of Pa and Shu. The people there are noble and the country is prosperous.
But their problem is that they are being subject to frequent intrusions by the
Barbarians to the southwest. As a result, the farmers cannot plow their fields,
and the traders cannot conduct their business in peace. The ruler, Liu Chang,
from the same house as yourself, is weak and ignorant. He does not know how to
hold the country. All of them may welcome you, well-known throughout the land
as trusty and righteous, a wholehearted hero, with open arms.
If you are able to defend the land from the Barbarians and maintain good
government, they will be able to pursue their livelihood in peace and prosper.
Then your granaries will be well stocked, and your coffers will be full. You
will be able to train a great army, keep Ts'ao Ts'ao occupied with the revolts
of dissatisfied people in his rear, make an alliance with Sun, and can await confidently
the day Heaven shall offer you the desired opportunity. Then you may depute a
worthy leader to go to the northeast while you yourself take command of an
expedition to the northwest and will you not find the warmest welcome prepared
for you by the people? The campaign will be brief and decisive and the Hans
will be restored. Afterwards, we can take back Wu".
End Result
Liu Pei
followed K'ung Ming's counsel and, in due course, became the ruler of Shu. What
remained for him was to maintain his alliance with Wu and continue the buildup
of his forces until, as K'ung Ming puts it, "the day Heaven shall offer
you the desired opportunity".
However, three things happened one after another to prevent Liu's dream from
coming true.
The first was the dispute between Shu and Wu over the possession of a town
called Chingchow that led to the killing of Kuan Yu and Chang Fei, Liu's sworn
brothers. Out of anger and anguish for his brothers' deaths, Liu simply ignored
K'ung Ming's advice to uphold the alliance with Wu and instead declared war
against it. The result was not surprising. The weaker Wu, unable to stand alone
against Shu, formed a pact with Wei, hitherto both Shu and Wu's common enemy.
In the ensuing fight, Liu was killed.
The second thing was Chuko's own mistake where he placed loyalty to a person
over his loyalty to the ideal.
At his deathbed, Liu told Chuko that since the principal mission was the defeat
of Wei, he should not hesitate to remove his heir, Liu Chan, if he proved
himself incompetent.
K'ung Ming, however, out of loyalty for his leader, found reason to ignore his
boss's counsel and, instead, chose to put Liu Chan to the throne. Eventually,
Shu was divided into two irreconcilable factions that ended with the abortion
of their lofty aim.
The third thing was the emergence of an able leadership in the Wei camp after
Tsao Tsao's death. Ssuma-i, formerly Tsao Tsao's lieutenant, introduced
reorganization of his government and army. Thus although he was often defeated
in battles with Shu, his forces were never broken up. He was able to exercise
authority and discipline over his troops at all times. Consequently, at Chuko's
death, he was able to defeat both Shu and Wu and began a new dynasty for the
reunified China.
If this story teaches something, it is of course that the bad guy can win if he
improves and the good guy can still lose if he doesn't.
Wu - Lesson for the non-Burmans

We now know what can happen to the good and the bad. Now what about the ugly?
Wu, unlike Shu, did not entertain aspirations to restore the former empire, but
to be left by itself, not unlike the non-Burmans who have no real interest in
seizing central power.
It is therefore interesting to analyze albeit summarily why Wu failed, and
conclude some historical lessons from it.
Its leader, Sun Ch'uan, did not want to be involved in the Shu-Wei politics,
but both were trying to enlist his support. Had he been more able and
farsighted, he would be in a position to take advantage both for himself and
his people. He might even have become a kingmaker, deciding who should be what
in Loyang, then China's
capital.
Regrettably, he so coveted the little city of Chingchow then in Shu's possession that he
attacked it and started an unnecessary war with Shu. This inevitably forced the
weaker Wu to ally with its sworn enemy, Wei, and finally be subjugated by the
latter.
A lesson might be taken here how the third party, by overlooking its strategic
advantages and long-term interests at the expense of its short-term interests,
can lose.
I think there are lots of other lessons for the interested reader as well. But
my advice is you read it either twice or four times. Because my Thai friends
say, "Never befriend anybody who reads the Three Kingdoms three
times".
Khuensai Jaiyen
7 October 1999
Adjunct
Non-Burmans are in the same position like Wu was. Both the military regime and
the Opposition need them. My suggestion is they should realize this and play
their cards well.
After all, Freedom is not waiting for things to happen. Freedom, on the
contrary, is making things happen.

