Politics in the Shan State JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

Politics in the Shan State

The Question of Secession from the Union of Burma

JOSEF SILVERSTEIN

The fourth of January 1958 was significant in Burma for two reasons: it marked the tenth anniversary of the nation’s independence and it also denoted the end of the constitutional limitation on the right of a state to secede from the Union^1. While the anniversary of independence caused rejoicing throughout the country, the right of secession caused many of the leaders to worry and wonder whether or not this date would become significant as the beginning of the breakup of the Union. Since the right of secession is a unique right, not found in any other modern federal constitution save that of the U.S.S.R.,² it is useful to examine the background and the contemporary situation in order to see what opportunities there are for a state to secede from the Union of Burma, and what limitations exist to keep it from exercising its right.

In spite of the broad language of the Constitution, only two states – the Shan and Kayah³ –are eligible to secede. Two others – the Kachin and Karen⁴ – are explicitly denied the right, while the remaining two states – the Special Chin Division⁵ and Burma proper – are usually considered outside of the discussion because the former is in many ways the appendage of the latter and Burma proper is the nucleus around which all the others cluster. Even though a whole chapter in the Constitution is devoted to describing the conditions which must be fulfilled before a state can withdraw form the Union, in effect, it is applicable only to one of the eligible states – the Shan State. It alone contains a powerful and articulate minority which is seriously considering the question of secession.

Before the constitutional and political questions connected with the right of secession can be discussed, an examination the relevant factors of geography, population, and history of the Shan State will contribute toward an understanding of the problem.

The author is an Instructor in Government at Wesleyan University and contributor to a forthcoming book on the Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia under the editorship of George McT. Kahin.

^{1 This article is an enlarged version of a paper which was read on April 3, 1958, at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in New York City.}

^{2 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as amended and added to at the Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Fourth Convocation; Art 17, “The right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to every Union Republic.”}

^{3 The Kayah State originally was named the Karenni State the inception of the Union of Burma in 1948. Its name was changed in 1951 in the Constitution Amendment Act, 1951 [Act No. LXII], Section 8.}

^{4 In the original Constitution, the Karen State was provided for. (Ch. IX, Part III.) Under the Amendment Act LXII, 1951, which brought the Karen State into being, the provision in regard to the territory was amended. Power was finally transferred to the Karen on June 1, 1954.}

^{5 The Special Division of the Chins is different from the other states of the Union in that there is no Head of State; the Council has no legislative powers and the Minister for Chin Affairs is in charge of Chin General Administration. (See CH. IX, Part V of the Constitution.)}

I

The Shan State lies in the central-eastern half of the Union of Burma. It is bounded on the west by the states of Kachin, Burma proper, and Kayah; on the east its borders touch China, Laos, and Thailand. Although there are some mountain passes and trails connecting the three neighbor nations with the Shan State, the area between them is rough and wild and only limited trade and travel takes place. At the same time, the links between the Shan State and Burma proper are good, having developed through centuries of trade, cultural exchange, and political association.

An examination of the population in the Shan State reveals that the area is neither overcrowded nor is it composed of an homogeneous people. The total estimated population in 1956 was 1,982,000⁶. In addition to the Shans, who are the most numerous with an estimated population of 991,000, there are the Pa-Os or Toungthus, who are related distantly to the Karens. They are believed to have a population of 224,000. The remaining 700,000 are a combination of Kachins, Burmese, Chinese, Indians, and a host of semiprimitive hill people, including among them the head-hunting Was. In reality only a small percentage of the Shans, Pa-Os, Burmese, and Kachins are politically aware of and participate in the politics of their state.

The history of the people in the Shan State provides a number of insights which bear upon the present problem. Although the historians know very little about the more primitive peoples of the area, they have learned about the Shans or Tais from the ancient chronicles and histories of the Burmans, Shans, and Chinese⁷. Among other things, these records confirm that the Shans lived in the area from as early as the beginning of the Christian era; that an important Shan Kingdom called the Mao existed there during the seventh century; that the Shans moved into the lightly populated area of northern Burma and the present Shan State, and either gained ascendancy over the more backward people with whom they came into contact, or else they drove them into the remote and nearly inaccessible regions of the territory. Modern historians are agreed that large-scale Shan immigration into this area took place during the thirteenth century and coincided with the Mongol attack upon the Tai kingdom of Nanchao (in modern Yunnan) in A.D. 1253⁸. When the first and most famous Burma empire – with its center at Pagan – crumbled and fell before the onslaught of the Mongols in 1287, the Shans attempted to fill the power vacuum which developed after the Mongols withdrew, and for the next two centuries they were one of the rival groups which contested for power throughout Burma. Their failure to realize that end can be traced in part to their inability to unify themselves under a single monarch with authority and power which all the petty Shan chiefs would recognize. By 1604-05 the Burmans recovered their vigor and, under the leadership of a new line of aggressive kings, conquered the quarreling Shans. From that date until 1885, the Shan chiefs were allowed to rule their areas as feudatories of

^{6 Those estimates were made by the Secretary of the Shan State Ministry, U Saw Tha, during a personal interview with the writer on April 10, 1956.}

^{7 One of the best histories of the peoples of the Shan State is J.C. Scott and J.P. Hardiman, Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States (Rangoon, 1900), I, I, 187-330; a useful short summary of early Shan State history and the relations between the Shans and the Burmans may be found in The Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry, 1947, I, Report (Rangoon, 1947) [hereafter FACOE].}

^{8 D.G.E. Hall, Burma (London, 1950), pp. 28-33; G. Harvey, History of Burma (London, 1925), pp. 13-15, 71-127.}

The Burmans; after that date they transferred their allegiance to the new rulers of Burma – the British.

The early relations between the chiefs and the British were governed by the patents or sanads which the latter gave to the former as symbols of their authority over the peoples in their territory;⁹ they included the terms to which the chiefs were expected to conform. According to these documents, a chief was confirmed in his rights “as a feudatory chief… empowered to govern his territory in all matters whether criminal, civil or revenue and was authorized to nominate… his successor,” on the condition that he continue to pay an annual tribute, give up his rights to the forests and minerals in his area, and that he allow the British Superintendent to advise in the peaceful settlement of disputes which might develop between the chiefs and peoples of neighboring Shan State.¹⁰ The British expected the chiefs to treat their subjects – both Shans and the minorities under rule – “justly and wisely” and “promote their happiness.” ¹¹ As long as they observed these terms and maintained law and order in their areas, the British did not interfere with local administration and purely internal matters.

To perpetuate the authority of the chiefs and insure their intellectual advancement over their subjects, the British established a special school in Taunggyi – in the Southern Shan State – to prepare the sons of the chiefs for higher education in Great Britain.¹²

The British neither introduced Western democratic ideas and institutions in the Shan States nor did they make any serious attempt to modify the almost absolute character of the chief’s authority. In 1922, when dyarchy was introduced in Burma proper and the people there began to experiment with parliamentary institutions, no such development took place in the Shan States. Instead, the British took steps to restrict the contacts between the Shan States and Burma proper. In political terms, they encouraged the States to federate; ¹³ this arrangement allowed the colonial rulers to deal with the chiefs on a collective basis and provided the chiefs with an institutional structure which made it possible for them to have greater contact with one another. In addition, the British allowed the chiefs to establish a federal fund which gave them greater autonomy and helped to separate their interests from those of the rest of Burma. In administrative terms, the British reorganized the civil service in Burma so that a separate administrative system was created to deal exclusively with the frontier areas. Both moves helped perpetuate the historic separatism between the two areas and feudatory rule in the Shan States. The only real contact between the two came through the institution of the Governor and the administrative system

^{9 Sir C. Crosthwaite, Pacification of Burma (London, 1912), is still the best of the early relations between the British and the frontier peoples. Also see C. Hendershot, “The Conquest, Pacification and Administration of the Shan States, 1886-97,” unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1936.}

^{10 Crosthwaite, pp. 161-162. Prior to independence, the present Shan State was divided into numerous feudatory states. In this essay the area will be referred to as the Shan States when the narrative describes the situation prior to independence in 1948. The term the Shan State will be used in discussing post-independence development.}

^{11 Statement of Sir Frederic Fryer, First Lt. Governor of Burma, at a durbar for Shan chiefs in Taunggyi, Headquarters of the Southern Shan States, May 7, 1895. As quoted in A. Ireland, the Province of Burma (Boston, 1907), II, 766-770.}

^{12 Ireland, p. 769.}

^{13 J. L. Christian, Burma and the Japanese Invaders (Bombay, 1945), pp. 324-325.}

Under his authority. The pattern was interrupted during World War II when the time-encrusted barriers between the peoples of both areas were removed.

In addition, it must be noted that although the Shans dominated the peoples in the area both politically and numerically, they never assimilated the minorities; as a result, cultural pluralism existed throughout the Shan States.

The impact of the Second World War on the political development of the States cannot be measured exactly because of the absence of reliable data.¹⁴ However, two developments are worthy of note because of their relation to contemporary problems. During the short period of Japanese authority in Burma, the new conquerors initiated a policy toward the frontier areas similar to that of the British. However, in 1943 they reversed themselves and, as a result, created conditions for the first time in which the peoples of Burma could mingle without restrictions. During the first phase, the Japanese policy for the Shan States was to keep the Burmese Nationalist Army and political leaders out of the States and out of contact with the hill peoples wherever possible. In December 1942 also, the Japanese transferred two Shan States to the Government of Siam.¹⁵ In 1943, the Japanese halted their policy of separatism. After creating the nominally independent Government of Burma under the leadership of Dr. Ba Maw, they entered into a treaty with their puppet Burmese government on September 25, 1943, and ceded all the Shan States, except the two which were already given to Siam, to the new government.¹⁶ Under this new arrangement the peoples of both areas were also work together for common ends. It was reliably reported that by 1944, branches of the East Asia Youth League, the National Service Association, and the Indian Independence League were established in the Shan States. In addition, British intelligence reports told that Shans were being recruited into the nationalist army of the Burmese.¹⁷ Thus, the institutional change of linking the areas together resulted in a political change where the peoples of both areas were able to meet and work together. It was from this period that the political awakening of the peoples of the Shan States can be measured.

After the war the wave of Burmese nationalism and the demand for independence swept outside of Burma proper and engulfed the more conservative hill peoples, especially the emerging popular elites among the Shan chiefs. The first reaction became evident in January 1946, when all the chiefs met and voluntarily agreed to share their administrative powers with their people. A year later in a London meeting the Burmese leader, Aung San, and the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, reached an agreement whereby the people of Burma proper were to be given their independence, and the peoples of the frontier areas were granted the right to join in the new state if

^{14 The best source of information on the war period is contained in the two-volume intelligence report of the Government of Burma, Burma during the Japanese Occupation (Simla, 1943-44). Although much of the material in the reports is unconfirmed, enough is verified so that it provides a reliable guide to events in Burma and the frontier areas at a time when the country was closed to normal means of gathering data and reporting.}

^{15 Burma during the Japanese Occupation, I, 14.}

^{16 A copy of the treaty is found in Burma during the Japanese Occupation, I, 28.}

^{17 Burma during the Japanese Occupation, II, 78-83. This short chapter about the Shan States is an excellent report about the impact of the war on the area. It was probably written by W.W. Payton, ICS, and the present writer had occasion to verify some of Payton’s conclusions while in Burma in 1955-56.}

They so desired.¹⁸ Ten days after that historic meeting and in response to its challenge, the chiefs and representatives from the people of the Shan States met in Panglong, in the Shan State, with their counterparts from among the Kachins and Chins, and agreed to join with the Burmese in forming an independent state. The Panglong Conference participants laid down a number of conditions covering the interim period before the actual transfer of power.¹⁹ The two most important were that they be represented in the interim Burmese government with the right of consultation on all matters pertaining to the hill areas; that the interim government give full administrative and financial autonomy to such areas as the Shan States, which already exercised these powers. Because the Burmese granted these concessions, the Panglong Agreement is the key document in the postwar, pre-independence relations between the hill peoples and the Burmese.

The Shans, like the other hill peoples, participated in the drafting of the Constitution; one of their delegates served as the second President of the Constituent Assembly, and later he was elected as the first President of the independent Union of Burma.²⁰

II

Because the question of secession from the Union of Burma is both a constitutional and a political problem, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the Constitution dealing with the structure of the state government and the right to secede.

The formal language of the Constitution does not give evidence of all the concessions and agreements which the Burmese and the frontier areas people made both prior to and during the drafting of the Constitution.²¹ While some of these appear in the Constitution, others are found in such documents as the already mentioned Panglong Agreement.

The agreements and the testimony taken by the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry clearly informed the Burmese leaders that the chiefs expected to retain internal autonomy in their traditional areas.²² Therefore the delegates to the Assembly avoided any description of local government in the state and restricted themselves to considering the form of the government at the state level. As a result, the chiefs retained administrative control over their individual territories after independence. They also were granted the exclusive right to elect from among their class the twenty-five members in the Union Parliament’s Chamber of Nationalities. The chiefs promised in exchange to surrender their traditional judicial authority, and they agreed to combine their territories into a single political unit.

The Burmese balanced their concessions to the chiefs by granting to the rest of the citizens of the state the exclusive right to hold all the Shan State seats in the Union Parliament’s most important chamber, the Chamber of Deputies. Thus a compromise

^{18 See Aung San-Attlee Agreement, January 27, 1947, Article, 8; an authentic copy will be found in Ministry of Information, Burma’s Fight for Freedom (Rangoon, 1948), p. 45.}

19 See Panglong Agreement, Feb. 1947; originally published in FACOE, I, 16-17.

^{20 Sao Shwe Thaik, Sawbwa (chief) of Yawnghwe, replaced Thakin Nu as President of the Constituent Assembly on July 30, 1947. During the third secession of the Assembly, September 15-24, 1947, he was appointed provisional President of the Union of Burma by the members of the Assembly.}

^{21 For a good discussion of these agreements and concessions, see J.F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, 1958), pp. 544-551.}

^{22 FACOE, II, 3-43.}

was worked out whereby the chiefs retained their prestige and participated in the Union legislative process; however, the real work of legislating on the Union level fell to the representatives of the people. In addition, the framers provided that there would be only one type of citizenship in Burma – Union citizenship.²³ This had the consequence of prohibiting the states from limiting the people’s rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.

These concessions reflect a willingness on the part of the Burmese to accommodate the hill peoples, especially the Shans. But at the same time the Constitution manifests the dominance of the Burmese and demonstrates their ability to establish a union in which the separate states appear to enjoy more autonomy than they actually were granted. This becomes clear in some of the limitations on the state governments. First, the Constitution provides that all state offices are to be filled indirectly. Members of the State Council are also members of the bicameral Union Parliament. Thus, a legislator sits in two houses and legislates, part of the time in the national interest and part of the time in the state’s interest. Because election to the National Legislature is the source of his mandate, it takes precedence over his state seat. The office of the Head of State, too, is filled automatically by the person whom the Prime Minister chooses as his Minister for that particular state. The combined Minister-Head of State owes his position solely to the Union Prime Minister and not to any legislative or elective body. The State Council has no authority to remove him, nor can it participate in his selection beyond offering advice to the Prime Minister. As a result of this unique arrangement, the office of Head of State is secondary to the holder’s responsibility as Minister in the Union Government.

The Constitution provides legislative and revenue lists which appear to give each unit of government – the Union and the state – separate spheres of activity.²⁴ However, this separation is compromised by the fact that in a declared emergency the Union Parliament can legislate on any subject.²⁵ This actually happened in 1952 when the President proclaimed a state of emergency in the Shan State which lasted until 1954. During that period, Parliament could and did legislate for and the Union Army, administered the areas singled out by the proclamation. Nor is the state’s power to raise revenue a liberating one. Since none of the states are viable in an economic sense, all accept grants from the Union Government in order to maintain their existence, and in this way compromise their independence.²⁶

^{23 Constitution, Ch. II, Art. 10.}

^{24 Constitution, Third Schedule, List II; the topics which the states are eligible to legislate are arranged under eight headings: Constitutional affairs, the writing of a state constitution, the establishment and maintenance of a state civil service; Economic affair, agriculture, fishing, land, markets, taxes on local and imported goods, employment, amusement, and gambling; Security, police and judicial; Communications, roads, municipal tramways, roadways, inland water traffic; Education, schools, libraries, and theaters; Public health, hospital, vital statistics, cemeteries; Local Government; General. The Union legislative powers are itemized in the same schedule under List I. If any subject arises which is not clearly included in either established list, the power goes to the Union and not to the states.}

^{25 Constitution, Ch. VI, Art. 92.1.}

^{26In the period prior to World War II, the Shan States were self-supporting. The Federal Fund, created in 1922, included contributions from the chiefs, which before that date went as tribute to the British. It also included funds from the Burma Government – a share of receipts on common subjects such as excise, customs, etc., and receipts from minerals and forests. After 1937, the Government of Burma no longer had to supplement the Fund to make up for a deficit; instead it paid the Federated Shan an exact portion of the taxes raised on commercial activity in their territories, which were sufficient to allow the fund to}

As a result of the concessions and the special provisions of the Constitution, the structure of the Shan State government may be summarized as follows: at the state level there is a State Council of fifty members, half of whom derive their seats from election to the Union Chamber of Deputies, and half from election to the Union upper house, the Chamber of Nationalities. They have power to legislate according to the state legislative list and advise the Prime Minister on his choice of the combination Head-Minister of the State. The Head of State has administrative powers and is responsible to the Prime Minister. At the local level, the thiry-three Shan chiefs exercise administrative authority over their traditional domains; they enjoy the rights of taxation and they raise extra revenues by controlling the gambling in their subdivisions. The people of the state have no right to remove the chiefs nor alter their form of rule. In the five major towns in the state,²⁷ administration is under Residents who, as state civil servants, are responsible to the Head of State.

The right of secession, which became operative in January 1958, in all probability originated out of the suggestion made by the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquriy which investigated the question of associating the frontier peoples with Burma in the period prior to the drafting of the Constitution.²⁸ Since a majority of the witnesses who appeared before it requested that the right of secession be included in the Constitution, the Committee recommended that the demand should be recognized. However, it warned that the framers must limit and regulate the right very carefully. The Constitution does both.²⁹ In recognizing the right, it lays down four conditions:

1. ten years must elapse before the right can be exercised;
2. to implement it, two thirds of the State Council must approve a resolution to secede;
3. the Head of State must notify the Union President of the vote, and the latter must order a plebiscite held in the state under a commission appointed by himself which is composed of an equal number of members from the Union and the state;
4. only states which are not excluded from using the right may exercise the privilege.

Among the political forces in the state, there are four identifiable groups which bear consideration. The Shan chiefs are the most powerful and best organized in the state. Although they are only thirty-three in number, their political power is greatly in excess of their size. Collectively they dominate the political organization called the United Hill Peoples Congress. Each chief controls a semifeudal domain which provides a retinue of followers, a source of revenue, and includes his own large land holdings. As a class they are well educated and personally wealthy. Individually, there are vast differences between them. During the last decade they split among themselves on the issue of how to transfer their administrative power to the people and what compensation they should receive in return. Their moderate group is led by Sao Hkun Hkio, who, in addition to being Head and Minister of the Shan State, is

develop a surplus. See FACOE, I, 14. The war, the changes in living patterns of the people, the increased services offered by the state, and the attempt to underwrite economic development, all contributed to the Shan State’s postwar need for financial aid from the Union Government. In answer to a question on state finances, U Saw Tha, Secretary for the Shan State, replied, “A major portion of the funds required for the administration of the Shan State is given by the Union Government… revenue listed in the State Revenue list… forms a minor portion of the funds required.”

^{27 Taunggyi, Loilem, Lashio, Loimwe, and Hopang.}

^{28 FACOE, I, 28-29.}

^{29 Constitution, Ch. X.}

one of the Deputy Prime Ministers of the Union. Opposing this faction is the group of reactionary chiefs who are led, at the present time, by the colorful wife of the Union of Burma’s first President, the Mahadavi of Yawnhwe. She and her group insist upon a large payment of compensation and a long list of special privileges in exchange for transferring their powers; this is the group which threatens to lead the Shan State in a secessionist movement.³⁰

In opposition to the chiefs there are the emerging organizations of the people of the state. The largest and most active of these is the Shan State People Freedom League which was modeled after, and partially organized by, the major political party of Burma, the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL). This Shan State organization is widely supported by the more advanced Shans, Kachins, Burmans, and other minority groups. It wishes to see the chiefs shorn of all their powers, and the existing system replaced with a socialist state on the lines laid down by the AFPFL for Burma proper. Its major spokesman is U Tun Aye, who is a member of Parliament from Namkham. He is moderate in his demands and supports the Union’s decision to pay the chiefs for transferring their power because he believes it will realize the end faster and more amicably than any other way. This group, numbering in the thousands, has attempted to establish a broad-based party with mass sub-organization attached to it. The only significant organization created thus far is the Shan State Peasants Organization.

The third force in Shan State politics is an ethnic group, the Pa-Os. They are well organized and politically advanced. Traditionally they have resisted Shan domination, and today they operate politically at two levels. Legally, they are organized as the United National Pa-O Organization under the leadership of U Tun Yee, their party’s secretary. They strive for the establishment of an autonomous state either in or out of the Union. They oppose the Union Government in the present Union Parliament, and they are opposed to the Union’s influence in the Shan State. Recently, they have been co-operating with the reactionary faction among the chiefs. This curious arrangement of co-operation between historical enemies developed in early 1955 when the chiefs promised the Pa-Os an autonomous state if they would support them in their struggle over the transfer of powers. Although this alliance is not drawn up formally, the two groups have continued to pursue similar courses within state politics.

At the illegal level, there are large groups of Pa-Os who are in revolt against the Union Government and who co-operate with the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO), the Communists, and the remnants of the Chinese Nationalist forces still in Burma. Their leader, Hla Pe, is a Karen form Thaton; he provides a link between the various revolutionary groups.

The fourth force in Shan State politics is the AFPFL, the Government party, and the Union Government. Both operate directly through the Union Prime Minister, in his control of the Minister-Head of State, and through the Union Legislature by its provision of funds for the state. The party operates unofficially through its affiliates in the state, the Shan State Peoples Freedom League and the All Shan State Organization.

^{30 For general background on Shan State politics, see the various series of articles on the subject in The Nation (Rangoon), Aug-Oct, 1955, and occasionally in 1956-57. The Nation has kept its readers informed on the actual happenings and the rumors connected with Shan State politics.}

In 1953, the Union Minister of Defence and top leader in the AFPFL, U Ba Swe, helped organize a new political party – the All Shan State Organization – which was supposed to join all political and ethnic groups into a single political party.³¹ SaoKhun Hkio became its president and U Tun Aye its secretary. Because the AFPFL attempted to exert too much pressure and because the organization failed to satisfy the particular demands of the various participating group, it lost a good part of its active support and declined in importance. It still exists today, has representation in the National Parliament, and is looked upon as the alter ego of the AFPFL without genuine roots in the domestic political scene.

In considering the influence of the Union Government on Shan State politics, the role of the Union Army is a major factor. In 1952, by a Presidential proclamation, martial law was declared in twenty two of the thirty-three State subdivisions, and the martial law was ordered to take command.³² That drastic step was precipitated by the growing strength and menace of the combined insurrectionary forces of the Karens and the remnants of the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) armies which were preying upon the local inhabitants of the state. The KNDO came into existence in 1947-48 when the Karens were fearful of their future under Burmese rule because of the communal riots and antipathy which marked the war period relations between the two communities.³³ In addition, having been rebuffed in their desire to establish an independent and autonomous state in Burma, they established village defense organizations and awaited their fate at the hands of the new government. In January 1949, no longer wishing to discuss statehood within the Union and having faced sporadic attacks by Burmese extremists, the KNDO attacked the Union forces and went into open revolt against the nascent government.³⁴ This action had an important impact upon the Union Army because whole units of Karen soldiers mutinied and joined forces with the rebels. The KNDO – well organized, led, and equipped – scored immediate successes in upper Burma and the southern Shan State, where it captured and held the town of Taunggyi for a number of months. The Karens attempted to win the support of their distant cousins, the Pa-Os, and were moderately successful, as suggested earlier. An important political crisis arose when a Kachin captain in the Union Army, Naw Seng, led his battalion into revolt and joined forces with the KNDO. As a rebel “brigadier general” he won victories in upper Burma and the Shan State, and attempted to win the political support of the hill peoples for the rebel movement. Unlike his military successes, Naw Seng failed in his political endeavor largely because the hill peoples – the Shans, Kachins, Chins, Kayahs – remained loyal to the Union and organized the United Hill Peoples Congress “for the prevention

^{31 Burma Weekly Bulletin, New Series, II, 33 (Nov, 18, 1953), p. 258. The Bulletin is the official information sheet published by the Union of Burma Ministry of Information.}

^{32 The Nation, Nov. 30, 1952, p.I. The proclamation came into effect on Dec. II, 1952, and was valid for six months or less.}

^{33 One of the best accounts of the war period relations between the two communities is found in I. Morrison, Grandfather Longlegs (London, 1947); see also Cady, pp. 442-444}

^{34 No complete story of the Karen insurrection has been written yet. Because the issues are complex and all the evidence is not in the public domain, one must use the reports and accounts with some caution. The Burmese newspapers are useful, but they tend to be biased against the Karens. The best accounts of the insurrections generally are to be found in Ministry of Information, Burma and the Insurrections (Rangoon, 1949); H. Tinker, The Union of Burma (London, 19457), pp. 34-62, 257-258, 351-352; Cady, pp. 549-550, 589-593.}

of the spread of the insurrection to their areas and for the consolidation of the Union of Burma.”³⁵ When the Union forces recaptured Taunggyi, late in 1949, Naw Seng retreated to the north and disappeared across the Chinese border, thus ending the major threat of mass defection by the frontier peoples.

At the time of the initial successes of the Karens in the southern Shan State, a new threat developed when remnants of the Chinese Nationalist armies, escaping from the Chinese Communists, crossed the border and entered Burma. At that time they numbered about 2,500, were well disciplined in their relations with the local inhabitants, and they settled east of the Salween in the sparsely populated Shan State subdivision of Kengtung.³⁶ The Union Army, faced with mass desertions and the immediate problem of defending the Union Government in lower Burma, was unable to intern or disarm the KMT forces. In the next few years, after abortive attacks on Communist China, the soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek dropped their pretenses as an army of liberation and settled down in the Shan State, recruited soldiers among the local population, and acting as “war lords,”³⁷ forced the local populace to support and serve them. By 1952, their forces were estimated at around 12,000; their activity and behavior became so openly aggressive that the Union Army was forced to divert some of its forces from the insurrections in Burma proper to fight against this foreign menace. This threat could be ignored no longer because the Burmese were fearful that the Chinese Communists might be provoked by the marauding KMT soldiers to enter Burma and settle accounts on their own.

By 1952 the Union Army was no longer the ethnically divided and poorly equipped organization it was at the outset of the insurrections in 1948. The troops were integrated into mixed units whose allegiance belonged to the Union Government and not to any ethnic or religious group. In addition, it was greatly increased in size and experience, its officers were well trained, and it was in a position to divert some of its forces and take action against the combined KMT-KNDO threat in the Shan State. Under the Presidential proclamation, the army assumed command from the local chiefs, reorganized local administration along the lines of local government in Burma proper, and began to improve existing social services as the rebellious and invading forces were driven into the wilder and less populated areas. Initially, the attitude of the people of the Shan State toward the Army was one of hostility and mistrust. However, the behavior of the troops, the mixed nature of the military units, and the general willingness of the officers and men to co-operate with the people, caused the local inhabitants of the Shan State to alter their original attitudes to friendliness, trust, and co-operation.³⁸ The direct intervention of the Army into state affairs prompted many to suggest that the Government planned to replace the federal structure with a unitary state by eventually incorporating the Shan State in Burma proper. This rumor persisted even after the army withdrew in 1954 and returned all power

^{35 Burma and the Insurrections, p. 14}

^{36 The best sources on the activities of the Chinese in Burma are found in Ministry of Information, Kuomintang Aggression Against Burma (Rangoon, 1953); Maung Maung, Grim War Against the KMT (Rangoon, 1953); Tinker, pp. 50-55, 345-348, 367-368; Cady, pp. 621-622.}

^{37 Tinker, p. 52}

^{38 The Nation, editorial, March 9, 1954, p. 4; Burma Weekly Bulletin, III, 7, May 20, 1953, P. 51; Ministry of Information, “The Shan State in 1953,” Burma, IV, 3, April 1954, p. 3.}

to the chiefs.³⁹ Thus, through direct and indirect political action, by economic aid and the activity of the Army, the Union Government has been a major influence in Shan State politics.

During the past ten years these four protagonists have played important roles in connection with the main political problem in the Shan State – the question of the transfer of power by the Shan chiefs. Briefly stated, the problem is as follows: in order to get the Shan chiefs to join with the rest of Burma in the formation of an independent state, the Burmese nationalist leaders agreed to allow all states that desired to enjoy autonomy in local government. In the Shan State this meant that the chiefs kept some of their traditional rights – such as powers of taxation and other means of raising revenues, and some administrative powers, and they shared in the legislative process at the Union and state level with the representatives of the people. In exchange, they surrendered outright their traditional judicial functions and their former exclusive rights to legislative power. Almost immediately after independence, the people of the Shan State began to demand that the chiefs transfer their administrative power to the people. The Shan State Peoples Freedom League and the United National Pa-O Organization led the fight, and, on August 18, 1951 the chiefs agreed to their demands.

Agreement, however was not transfer. Questions remained as to how it should be done; what compensation should be paid to the chiefs; and what rights, if any, should be retained by them. Before any decisions could be made, the Union Government was forced to impose military rule in parts of the state because of the KMT-KNDO threat; the nation paid little attention to the fact that the Union Government sent a Shan delegation to India to investigate that country’s experience in taking power and integrating the princely states. The inquiry commission returned from India in January 1953, made its report to the Union Government and the matter rested there for a short while.⁴⁰

In the meantime, the Shan chiefs grumbled but continued to co-operate with the Government and the Army. The organizations of the people of the Shan State generally approved of the substitution of military for rule by the chiefs. The Shan State Peoples Freedom League attempted to expand its organization among the people, and sought to realize some of its social and economic goals under military sponsorship. The Pa-Os, too, co-operated for a while. They changed their attitude when they discovered that the Army and the Government were not in full sympathy with their ultimate goal of an autonomous state. At first the people as a whole were suspicious of the Army, but gradually they came to accept it because of the many social and economic benefits that it brought. When military rule ended on July 31, 1954, and the Army returned full administrative powers to the feudal rulers, the move emboldened the chiefs to stiffen their demands; at the same time it discouraged and embittered the leaders of the popular organizations because it appeared to be a regressive step. Since the Union Government had given support to those political groups favoring democratic government throughout Burma, it seemed now that it was changing its stand and was willing to support the chiefs.

From 1952 onward the Government and the chiefs continued to negotiate secretly

^{39 The Nation, Aug. 8, 1954, p.1.}

^{40 Burma Weekly Bulletin, II, 43 (Jan. 28, 1953), p. 2}

about the transfer power. On July 17, 1953, the chiefs presented seventeen demands to the Government as their price for transfer. In particular they asked:

1. that they retain their titles,
2. that they receive compensation in lieu of the revenues which they would lose,
3. that they retain their seats in the Chamber of Nationalities,
4. that they be given the right to hold other offices according to their ability,
5. that the Union assume the financial burden of educating their descendants,
6. that they should to hold traditional family lands,
7. that they should have the right to pass their titles, rights and possessions to their descendants.

The amount of compensation was undisclosed, but it was estimated to be between two and thirteen million dollars in local currency. The chiefs based their claim on the fact that they had received certain revenues since 1922;⁴¹ if they continued to receive the same income, their projected earnings would be in excess of their actual demands. The Shan State Peoples Freedom League supported the Government’s decision to pay the chiefs for two reasons:

1. because payment would bring about a faster solution with less ill-feeling on all side, and
2. because the League was aware that there was a large element of politically backward people who looked to the chiefs for leadership and who might be expected to fight for the chiefs if power was taken arbitrarily.

The chiefs were not of a single mind on this issue. Although all had agreed to give up their powers in 1951, by 1955, some were not anxious to fulfill their commitment. The majority gradually shifted from the moderate to the more reactionary group. The latter were encouraged by a number of things: the apparent support of the Pa-Os; the victories of the United Hill Peoples Congress in the 1956 elections; that time was on their side and the longer they held out, the more real the right of secession became and the stronger their bargaining position grew. During 1956 and 1957, this group publicly discussed the possibility of invoking the right of secession if the Union Government did not meet all its demands.⁴² They formed a new party late in 1956 called the Shan State Unity Party, and passed resolutions advocating secession rather than surrender their powers. They felt strong enough in 1956 to criticize the Union Government’s treaty with the State of Israel. The treaty called for the cultivation of a million acres of vacant land in the Shan State under Israel management and with the object of selling the produce to Israel. The protest of the chiefs was echoed by the Shan students in University of Rangoon, and the Government felt called upon to announce publicly that the treaty had been amended to read “one million acres of vacant land in the Union of Burma” instead of in the Shan State.⁴³

The Government was not unaware of the growing intransigence of the reactionary majority group of Shan chiefs. While on the surface it appeared to give way to their less important demands, underneath it continued to negotiate secretly and refused to debate the issues publicly. The first real indication that the Government and the

^{41 The revenues of the chiefs were as follows: in Kengtung, North Hsenwi, South Hsenwi, Yawnghwe, Hsipaw, Tawngpeng, and Mongmit, the chiefs were allowed to keep 15% of the total revenues collected; in all other states, 25%. These allowances were established by the British in 1922. In addition the chiefs earned added income from leasing the gambling rights in their states and other activity which has never been reported in detail, but which lay outside the jurisdiction of the Buritish first and the Union of Burma later.}

^{42 The Nation, Feb. 19, 1957; July 2, 1957.}

^{43 The Nation, Dec. 29, 1956.}

chiefs had reached a settlement came during the 1956 budget session of the Parliament.⁴⁴ At that time, U Tun Aye, of the Shan State Peoples Freedom League, called attention to the fact that the general appropriation for the state included an item of K50 lakhs or five million dollars which was slated as the first half of the payment to the chiefs. In the present budget there is a similar item for the same amount. Even though the Government has not explained its position in regard to settlement with the chiefs, it is felt generally that the two appropriations present its total sum of payment. The Government partially broke its silence in April 1957, when U Nu said, while on a visit to the Shan State, that the Government would make an announcement of settlement with the chiefs before September 1957. However, by Independence Day, 1958, when the right of secession became operative, the Government still had not announced any settlement, nor had the Shan chiefs attempted to carry out their threats of secession.

III

In the light of the proceeding certain questions emerge which remain unanswered. Is the right of secession a right which the framers of the Constitution intended to be used or did they include it as window-dressing, as the Russians did in their Constitution of 1936?⁴⁵ If it is a genuine right, under what conditions will it probably be used? Finally, where would the Shan State go if it did secede?

A careful reading of the Constitution and the documents relating to the formation of the Union, suggests that the framers intended the right to be a measure of protection for those hill peoples who were dubious about allying themselves with the dominant and politically more advanced state of Burma proper. Following the advice of the Frontier Areas Enquiry Committee Report, the framers clothed the right with a time restriction, a demand for an extra-ordinary, a vague proposition which calls for legislation to interpret its meaning. The time restriction has passed, and the extra-ordinary majority requirement of two thirds in the State Council is not impossible to get if the issue is sufficiently important and there is widespread sentiment expressed for its adoption. The real check on the right remains in the article which requires that the President “order a plebiscite to be taken for the purpose of ascertaining the will of the people of the State.”⁴⁶ Such questions as who shall vote in such a plebiscite and what majority is necessary to express the people’s will are left to be legislated by the Union Parliament. Thus the framers provided a means for each Parliament to review the right and decide whether or not it wants to make the right exercisable by making the franchise and the necessary majority either easy or difficult to obtain. Since the legislature has not acted to fill this particular gap, it is unknown at this time whether or not the present leaders of the Union really want the right of secession to be exercisable.

^{44 The Nation, Sept, 14, 1956}

^{45 According to Andre Vyshinsky, The Law of the Soviet State (New York, 1948), pp. 272-273, in order for an autonomous republic to be elevated to a Union Republic and enjoy the right of secession, it must meet three conditions:}

1. it must “be a border land, not encircled on all sides by U.S.S.R. territory”;
2. “it is necessary that the nationality which gave the Soviet Republic its name represent therein a more or less compact majority”;
3. It must have a population of at least one million. Vyshinsky drew upon Stalin’s “Report on the Draft of the U.S.S.R. Constitution” for this section.

^{46 Constitution, Ch. X, Art 204.}

However, if we assume that it is a genuine right, when and under what conditions will it be used? First, it probably will not be invoked until the people of the state are faced with a “real” issue and have no other recourse for the protection of their interests. Because of the heterogeneous nature of the populace, the issue must affect the majority of the politically conscious minorities in such a way as to cause them to set their separate antagonisms side and unity for a common end. No issue of this magnitude has arisen since the people of the Shan State decided to join with Burma in the formation of an independent political union. The issue of the transfer of power by thirty-three semifeudal ruler is not sufficient to arouse early two million people to demand secession from the Union, especially since the chiefs are being asked to transfer their historic rights to the people of their state and not to the Union Government or the nation at large. The decade of negotiations, the return of power to the chiefs by the Army, and the Union’s agreement pay compensation to the chiefs are not the type of acts which provoke people to demand extreme measures.

To the question of where the Shan State would go if it did withdraw from the Union, the answer seems quite clear if one examines a map of the area. Because it is landlocked and has no major navigable river to link it to the sea, the state either would have to unify or ally with China, Thailand, or join with another landlocked area – Laos, Economically the state has great potential as a producer of minerals and agricultural crops;⁴⁷ however, it still has far to go to realize its potential. It has neither sufficient capital nor the technically trained personnel to do the necessary job. The state has looked to the Union since its inception for financial aid to meet operating expenses and pay for the minimal social services that it provides. The potential richness of the land and the limited population wold make the state an inviting target for land-hungry, overpopulated China.

From the Shan State’s point of view, there are no current ties with any one of the three that makes the thought of a new union seem attractive. Although the Shans are ethnic and linguistic kin to the Thais, there is no feeling of irredentism among the people, nor is there any political movement in the state which advocates this goal. From the limited information available, the war experience of the Shan States, which were annexed by Siam, did not awaken any dormant desires nor provoke any outcry when the Allies returned the States to British control at the end of the war. Toward China, there is even less attraction. Probably the strongest case for unity with China could be made by the residents in the Shan subdivision of Kokang, where the Chinese outnumber all others by nine to one. However, the people of this area have maintained a steadfast loyalty to the Union. They were insistent from the outset of independence that they receive Union citizenship, and they have made no effort to renounce it.⁴⁸ Finally, there seems to be no political or

^{47 See Comprehensive Report, Economic and Engineering Development of Burma, prepared by Knappen, Tippetts, Abbett and McCarthy Engineers, I, I 3-18.}

^{48 The territory known as Kokang was ceded to British Burma by the Chinese in pursuance of the Peking Convention of 1897. During the hearings of the Frontier Areas Enquiry Commission in 1947, two representatives attended and gave evidence on April 11, 1947. The son of the hereditary chief of Myosa reported that out of the state’s population of 40,804, 33,474 were Chinese. Both representatives indicated that if their state did not get internal autonomy it would join with any other nation which would give it to them. See FACOE, II, 314. After Independence in 1948, a Burma Citizenship Enquiry Commission classified the Chinese of Kokang as citizens of Burma. Since most of them do not speak Shan or Burmese,}

economic reason – historic or current – to warrant the creation of a Laos-Shan union. And from the Union’s point of view, if the state attempted to ally or unify with its immediate neighbors, it does not seem realistic that it would allow such a merger to take place. In military terms, it would bring China or Thailand into the heartland of the Union, and it would create such an exposed border that defense of Burma would be nearly impossible. In addition, the Burmese could not permit the area to fill with Chinese. The Union already is alarmed about the illegal immigration of hundreds of Chinese who cross the present border between the two countries and become absorbed in the growing Chinese communities in the Shan State and in the rest of Burma. If the state were overrun with Chinese, there would be no way of keeping them from overflowing into the rest of Burma. In economic terms, the Union has large investments in the Shan State and includes it in all of its major development plans as an important source of raw materials and as a recipient of the benefits which will be realized from development of the whole area. The loss of the Shan State would be a serious blow to the Union, a blow from which it might not recover. It seems reasonable to assume that if the state attempted to invoke its right of secession it might provoke the Union to use force to use force to keep it from seceding. This conclusion is suggested in the speech of Prime Minister U Nu, which he delivered at Lashio on April 27, 1957;⁴⁹ in it he called attention to the history of the civil war in the United States and drew this lesson, “… the reason that the United State today is the strongest and most influential nation in the world is due to the fact that Abraham Lincoln prevented the southern State from seceding and thus consolidated the whole country. If only we are united our future is indeed bright. Therefore, it is my constant prayer that this remarkable episode from American history may serve as a very valuable lesson for all of us.”

The right of secession must be viewed as an unrealized and vague power which is more useful as a potential then as a reality. As one Shan leader explained the right of secession in Burma, it is an “unopened treasure chest, an unlighted beacon.”⁵⁰ So long as it remains a potential right, it will be useful to the people of the Shan State as a bargaining weapon because the leaders of the Union are determined to establish the rule of law and respect for the Constitution. The history of the relations between the Union and the state confirm this fact. The protracted negotiations and the return of power by the Army were acts of good faith and respect by a large and more powerful unit for a small and weaker one. In the end, the right must be viewed in two ways: constitutionally, it is exercisable; politically, it is not. So long as the state has the right in reserve, it will continue to give the people a feeling of having a potential choice of either remaining in or leaving the Union. If it attempts to exercise the right it may provoke the Union to act as Lincoln acted, even though the Union of Burma’s Constitution includes the right of secession, while that of the United States does not.

they have been mistaken for illegal Chinese immigrants. They have complained that they have no identification from the Union to prove their citizenship and protect them from harassment by border officials.

See The Nation, December 6, 1954, for the case of Hoo Kya Chin, which demonstrates this point.

^{49 Reported in full in The Nation, May 8, 1957, P. 1.}

^{50 The Nation, July 2, 1957, p. 4, in al letter to the editor}